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Kansas SAKI Research Testing Priorities Archival
This SAKI TTA webinar was held on Tuesday, September 26 from 2:00-3:30 PM EDT.
As more state and local jurisdictions begin to tackle the issue of previously unsubmitted SAKs, the limited resources for testing and investigations continue to be a challenge. Kansas, in particular, has identified an inventory of over 2,200 previously unsubmitted SAKs. These cold cases are resulting in nearly double the number of CODIS hits expected. As a result, the Kansas SAKI team recognized the value in leveraging research data to develop evidence-based recommendations to prioritize testing and to provide resources to local jurisdictions to assist case review and investigations of CODIS hit cases. Based on the evaluation of a cross-sectional sample of unsubmitted SAKs in Kansas, this webinar focused on the findings pertaining to creating a testing prioritization model and discussed the resources developed by the Kansas SAKI team for local jurisdictions to notify victims and review cases resulting in a CODIS hit. 

At the conclusion of this webinar, participants were better able to: 

-Recognize the types of overlapping offenses that are commonly seen from sexual assault suspects. 
-Understand the value in prioritizing forensic analysis of cases through suspect criminal history demographics to identify suspects who pose a high risk to public safety. 
-Develop resources to assist local jurisdictions with case review and victim notification. 
-Identify the underlying factors that have contributed to the accumulation of unsubmitted SAKs.

Speaker

Megan Roberts
Megan Roberts is a Program Consultant at the Kansas Bureau of Investigation designated as the Kansas SAKI Site Coordinator.
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This project was supported by Grant No. 2015-AK-BX-K021 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.